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RECENT CASE
SONNER V. PREMIER NUTRITION CORP.
Federal Common Law’s Limitation of California UCL and
CLRA Equitable Restitution
Ruth Dapper, Esq. & Bryce Young, Esq.*
INTRODUCTION
When sitting in diversity jurisdiction, must a federal court apply
federal equitable principles when deciding state law claims, even if
state law may provide a different outcome? That was the question
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the
case of Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp.1 Although the Ninth Circuit’s
published opinion relies on “seventy-five years” of unchanged law,2 the
opinion joins a long list of cases that continue to help clarify the tenets
from Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins3 and inform the courts and
practitioners on the relationship between state and federal authority
in diversity jurisdiction.
In short, the Ninth Circuit in Sonner confirmed that “a federal
court must apply traditional equitable principles before awarding
restitution [available under state law].”4 The reasoning for this
outcome is straightforward: “[S]tate law can neither broaden nor
restrain a federal court’s power to issue equitable relief.”5 And this
© 2021 Ruth Dapper & Bryce Young. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Publication in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to
Notre Dame Law Review Reflection, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Bryce Young is a litigator at Duane Morris LLP. Ruth Dapper is a litigator at DLA
Piper LLP (US). Bryce and Ruth are based in San Diego, California.
1 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020). This amended opinion was issued after the panel
denied the petition for rehearing. Id. at 837.
2 Id. at 841.
3 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4 971 F.3d at 841.
5 Id.
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outcome has serious teeth—an equitable remedy (and the attendant
monetary amounts) available under state law may be barred by federal
equitable principles.
I.

CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMERS LEGAL
REMEDIES ACT

As relevant here, California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and
Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) are commonly invoked in
consumer litigation, including class actions. The UCL prohibits
“unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s]” and
“unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.”6 The CLRA
prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to
result or that results in the sale . . . of goods or services to any
consumer.”7 The UCL “is equitable in nature” and UCL remedies are
“generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.”8 The CLRA has
greater flexibility, including restitution of property, actual damages,
punitive damages, and “[a]ny other relief that the court deems
proper.”9
When only equitable relief is sought, a jury trial is not appropriate
and instead a bench trial is held.10
II.

SONNER V. PREMIER NUTRITION CORP.

A. The District Court Permitted Plaintiff to Amend the Complaint to
Remove a Prayer for Damages, Leaving Only Equitable Relief
Sonner was filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California in early 2013 as a putative class action.11
The lawsuit centered on alleged false advertising in connection with a
dietary product.12 The action proceeded through litigation over the
6 CAL. BUS. & PRO. CODE § 17200 (West 2020).
7 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 2020).
8 Chowning v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 735 Fed. App’x 924, 924 (9th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 943 (Cal. 2003)).
9 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(a)(1)–(5) (West 2020).
10 See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 611 F.2d 296, 307 (9th Cir.
1979) (affirming district court’s order “concluding that since only equitable claims
remained to be tried, trial to a jury would be inappropriate”); Nationwide Biweekly Admin.,
Inc. v. Superior Ct., 462 P.3d 461, 486 (Cal. 2020) (“For nearly a half century, Court of
Appeal decisions have explicitly and uniformly held that actions under the UCL and FAL
are equitable in nature and are to be tried by the court and not by a jury.”).
11 Mullins v. Premier Nutrition Corp., No. 13-cv-01271, 2018 WL 510139 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 23, 2018), aff’d sub nom Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020).
12 Sonner, 971 F.3d at 837–39 (discussing procedural history of underlying district
court’s order).
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course of the next few years, and, in April 2016, the district court
certified a class of California consumers who had purchased the
product.13
UCL and CLRA claims were pleaded throughout the various
iterations of the operative complaints.14 Less than two months before
the jury trial was to begin, Plaintiff Kathleen Sonner sought to drop
her claim seeking damages pursuant to the CLRA as an apparent tactic
to avoid a jury trial.15 Defendant Premier Nutrition Corporation
(“Premier”) opposed Sonner’s request to amend the complaint,
arguing the amendment was futile because restitution under the UCL
and CLRA cannot properly be pleaded while an adequate remedy at
law exists (e.g., CLRA monetary damages).16 The court permitted
Sonner to amend the complaint to remove the request for CLRA
damages, but warned Sonner that the court would not later permit her
to amend her complaint again in order to re-plead for CLRA
damages.17
Sonner filed an amended complaint removing the CLRA damages
prayer.18 Sonner thus had two remaining claims: violation of the UCL

13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 838 (“[W]hy would Sonner voluntarily abandon an ostensibly viable claim on
the eve of trial after more than four years of litigation? The answer is also obvious: to request
that the district court judge award the class $32,000,000 as restitution, rather than having
to persuade a jury to award this amount as damages.”); Memorandum of Plaintiff in Support
of Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint at 6, Mullins, 2018 WL 510139
(No. 13-cv-01271) (arguing against the court holding a jury trial due to the proposed
amendment); id. at Exhibit B, 21 (showing proposed removal of jury demands and claim to
damages).
16 See Memorandum of Defendant in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims
for Equitable Restitution at 4, Mullins, 2018 WL 510139 (No. 13-cv-01271) (“Before a party
can avail herself of a court’s equitable jurisdiction, she must first demonstrate that her
remedy at law is inadequate.”); Memorandum of Defendant in Opposition to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint at 3, Mullins, 2018 WL 510139 (No.
13-cv-01271) (“Courts routinely recognize that equitable claims under [UCL and CLRA]—
which are the claims that would remain at issue in Plaintiff’s proposed amended
complaint—are deficient and subject to dismissal where there is a legal remedy, such as
monetary damages, available to the plaintiff.”).
17 See Memorandum of Defendant in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims
for Equitable Restitution, supra note 16, at Exhibit B, 18. In the transcript of the
proceedings on the motion to amend, the court stated, “And if I grant [plaintiff’s motion
to amend the complaint to remove the damages prayer], we are never going to hear again
anything about a damage claim under the CLRA” and plaintiff’s counsel responded, “I
completely agree.” Id. Plaintiff’s counsel then addressed that if plaintiff were able to
amend the complaint and defendant were to successfully move to dismiss that amended
complaint, plaintiff would then move to amend again “and presumably but maybe not be
granted leave to amend to put back in the rest of it.” Id. The court responded, “I wouldn’t
put a lot of money on that one.” Id.
18 Sonner, 971 F.3d at 838.
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and violation of the CLRA.19 As relief, her prayer included two forms
of equitable relief: (1) equitable restitution and disgorgement and (2)
injunctive relief.20
Sonner sought $32,000,000 as restitution
damages—this was the same monetary amount she had requested as
CLRA monetary damages from the prior complaint.21 With CLRA
damages no longer pleaded in the operative complaint, the court
vacated the jury trial.22
B. The District Court Determined a Claim for Equitable Restitution
Required a Showing That No Adequate Remedy at Law Existed
Premier moved to dismiss the new complaint’s claims for
equitable restitution, arguing under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and (b)(6) that Sonner needed to establish that she lacked
an adequate legal remedy and thus could not pursue her claims of
restitution under UCL and CLRA.23
Reviewing Premier’s motion to dismiss under a Rule 12(b)(6)
standard, the district court noted: “In the Ninth Circuit, the relevant
test is whether an adequate damages remedy is available, not whether
the plaintiff elects to pursue it, or whether she will be successful in that
pursuit.”24 Sonner argued that, because “the UCL and the CLRA
expressly provide a statutory right to restitution . . . , a plaintiff seeking
relief under those statutes is not required to plead an inadequate
remedy at law.”25 The court disagreed, concluding that the authorities
cited by Sonner did not shed light on whether the “plaintiff may seek
a remedy for past harm when she has an adequate remedy at law for
that exact same past harm.”26 Rather, the court determined California
law had not removed the inadequate remedy doctrine and then
concluded Sonner’s choice to not “request damages does not relieve
her from having to show that her remedy at law is inadequate. Because
she has not done so, and . . . is unable to do so, she may not proceed
on her equitable claims for restitution in lieu of a damages claim.”27
19 See Memorandum of Plaintiff in Support of Motion for Leave to File Second
Amended Complaint, supra note 15, at Exhibit B, 17–22.
20 Id. at Exhibit B, 21.
21 Sonner, 971 F.3d at 837.
22 Id. at 838.
23 Mullins v. Premier Nutrition Corp., No. 13-cv-01271, 2018 WL 510139, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 23, 2018), aff’d sub nom Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir.
2020).
24 Id. at *2.
25 Id. at *3.
26 Id. at *4; accord Sonner, 971 F.3d at 838 (“Specifically, the district court concluded
that claims brought under the UCL and CLRA remained subject to California’s inadequateremedy-at-law doctrine, and that Sonner failed to establish that she lacked an adequate legal
remedy for the same past harm for which she sought equitable restitution.”).
27 Mullins, 2018 WL 510139, at *4.
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On this ground, the court granted Premier’s motion to dismiss as to
the equitable restitution relief and denied Sonner’s request to re-plead
the CLRA damages.28 A few months later, the court dismissed the
remainder of the lawsuit (solely seeking injunctive relief) and entered
judgment with prejudice in favor of Premier Nutrition Corp.29 Sonner
then appealed to the Ninth Circuit the order dismissing her equitable
restitution claims.30
C. The Ninth Circuit Determined a Federal Court Must Apply Traditional
Equitable Principles Before Awarding Restitution Under the UCL and
CLRA (Even If State Law Would Provide Otherwise)
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit framed the preliminary (and
ultimately dispositive) question before it as: “[D]o federal equitable
principles independently apply to Sonner’s equitable claims for
restitution or must we, as a federal court, follow only the state law
authorizing that equitable remedy?”31 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit
noted this was “not the basis for the district court’s decision.”32
Sonner argued that state principles alone apply because the case
was a diversity action and involved state statutes.33 Premier argued that
Sonner’s claims failed under state law, but also that federal courts in
diversity are “bound by traditional federal equitable principles.”34
These federal principles include, Premier reasoned, the mandate that
to successfully pursue equitable relief, the claiming party must
establish that it lacks an adequate legal remedy.35
To address this question, the Ninth Circuit explained the relevant
history of the Erie doctrine. “It has long been the province of federal
courts sitting in equity to apply a body of federal common law
irrespective of state law.”36 This federal common law had been
“narrowed considerably” by the Erie doctrine, which has long held that
“federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must follow state
substantive law and federal procedural law when adjudicating state law
claims.”37 To determine “whether a law is substantive or procedural,”
courts “generally use the ‘outcome-determination test,’ which asks
whether applying federal law instead of state law would ‘significantly
28 Id. at *5.
29 Answering Brief of Appellant at 4, Sonner, 971 F.3d 834 (No. 18-15890).
30 Sonner, 971 F.3d at 838–39.
31 Id. at 839.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. (citing Russell v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 139, 147 (1851)).
37 Id. at 839–40 (first discussing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); and
then citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)).
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affect’ the litigation’s outcome.”38 “Thus, the outcome of a case in
federal court should generally be ‘substantially the same, so far as legal
rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a
State court.”39 Even so, “since Erie, the Supreme Court has instructed
that a federal court’s equitable authority remains cabined to the
traditional powers exercised by English courts of equity, even for
claims arising under state law.”40
In addressing the appropriate scope and use of federal common
law principles, the Ninth Circuit drew guidance from Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, a Supreme Court opinion issued seven years after Erie.41
The York Court examined whether a state statute of limitations could
defend against a state law equitable claim.42 The York opinion
concluded that “[e]quitable relief in a federal court is of course subject
to restrictions,” and suggested an example of such a restriction would
be that “a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law must be
wanting.”43 York emphasized, therefore, that “[s]tate law cannot
define the remedies which a federal court must give simply because a
federal court in diversity jurisdiction is available as an alternative
tribunal to the State’s courts.”44 In summation, York guided that
“[f]ederal courts must therefore enforce ‘[s]tate-created substantive
rights if the mode of proceeding and remedy [are] consonant with the
traditional body of equitable remedies, practice and procedure.’”45
Applying York’s principles to the present case, the Ninth Circuit
held that “a federal court must apply traditional equitable principles
before awarding restitution under the UCL and CLRA [because i]t has
been a fundamental principle for well over a century that state law
cannot expand or limit a federal court’s equitable authority.”46
The Ninth Circuit explained federal courts must “nonetheless
apply principles of federal common law” even if the federal application
could result in a federal court reaching a decision that may differ from
a state court’s treatment.47 “Even assuming California decided as a
matter of policy to streamline UCL and CLRA claims by abrogating the
state’s inadequate-remedy-at-law doctrine, the strong federal policy
protecting the constitutional right to a trial by jury outweighs that
38 Id. at 839 (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)).
39 Id. (quoting Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)).
40 Id. at 840 (citing York, 326 U.S. at 104–07).
41 See id. at 841.
42 Id. at 840 (citing York, 326 U.S. at 100–01, 107).
43 Id. (quoting York, 326 U.S. at 105) (emphasis omitted).
44 Id. (quoting York, 326 U.S. at 106).
45 Id. (citing York, 326 U.S. at 106) (last alteration in original).
46 Id. at 841 (“[I]n seventy-five years, the Supreme Court has never repudiated its
statement in York—offered seven years after Erie—that state law can neither broaden nor
restrain a federal court’s power to issue equitable relief.”).
47 Id. (citing York, 326 U.S. at 105–06).
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procedural interest.”48 This outcome is necessary, concluded the
Ninth Circuit, because, “[s]ince York, the [U.S. Supreme] Court has
never held or suggested that state law can expand a federal court’s
equitable powers, even if allowing such expansion would ensure a
similar outcome between state and federal tribunals.”49
Finally, the Ninth Circuit noted opinions from the Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals “mirror[ed the
holding that] state law cannot circumscribe a federal court’s equitable
powers even when state law affords the rule of decision.”50 Several of
those opinions had similarly quoted and relied on York as well.51 The
Ninth Circuit further noted opinions from the Eighth and Eleventh
Circuit Courts of Appeals similarly agreed on the principles, albeit in
different contexts.52
Applying the now-decided threshold jurisdictional decision, the
Ninth Circuit concluded “that the traditional principles governing
equitable remedies in federal courts, including the requisite
inadequacy of legal remedies, apply when a party requests restitution
under the UCL and CLRA in a diversity action.”53 The Ninth Circuit
determined “Sonner fail[ed] to make such a showing” because “the
operative complaint does not allege that Sonner lacks an adequate
legal remedy.”54 Moreover, “Sonner concede[d] that she seeks the
same sum in equitable restitution as . . . she requested in damages to
compensate her for the same past harm.”55 And she “fail[ed] to
explain how the same amount of money for the exact same harm is
inadequate or incomplete, and nothing in the record supports that
conclusion.”56
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed—“albeit on alternative
grounds” and without addressing California law—the district court’s

48 Id. at 842.
49 Id. at 841–42.
50 Id. at 843 (first citing Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners, L.P., 913 F.3d 959, 972–
73 (10th Cir. 2019); then citing SSMC, Inc., N.V. v. Steffen, 102 F.3d 704, 708 (4th Cir.
1996); then citing Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 646 F.2d 800, 806 (2d Cir.
1981); then citing Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State v. Oneida Cnty, 464 F.2d 916, 922
(2d Cir. 1972); then citing Clark Equip. Co. v. Armstrong Equip. Co., 431 F.2d 54, 57 (5th
Cir. 1970); and then citing Hertz v. Record Publ’g Co. of Erie, 219 F.2d 397, 398 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1955)).
51 See id. (first citing Davilla, 913 F.3d at 972–73; and then citing SSMC, Inc., 102 F.3d
at 708).
52 Id. (first citing Nat’l P’ship Inv. Corp. v. Nat’l Hous. Dev. Corp., 153 F.3d 1289,
1291–92 (11th Cir. 1998); and then citing Aviation Supply Corp. v. R.S.B.I. Aerospace, Inc.,
999 F.2d 314, 316 (8th Cir. 1993)).
53 Id. at 844.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.

2021]

SONNER V. PREMIER NUTRITION CORP.

81

dismissal of Sonner’s claims for equitable restitution.57 “Regardless of
whether California authorizes its courts to award equitable restitution
under the UCL and CLRA when a plain, adequate, and complete
remedy exists at law, we hold that federal courts rely on federal
equitable principles before allowing equitable restitution in such
circumstances.”58
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Sonner’s request to amend the
complaint to reallege CLRA damages, particularly since Sonner
“strategically chose” to drop them and the district court had warned
her of the risks.59
III.

SONNER’S IMPLICATIONS AS TO STATE LAW CLAIMS IN FEDERAL
COURT

The Sonner opinion accords with other district court decisions in
the Ninth Circuit that have dismissed UCL and CLRA claims—
including at the pleadings stage—where a party failed to demonstrate
a lack of adequate remedy at law,60 and resolves this issue to the extent
there was potentially confusing language among district courts.61
Notably for federal courts and practitioners, Sonner reaffirms that
parties cannot pursue equitable restitution if an adequate remedy
exists, even if not originally pleaded. Thus, while Sonner abandoned
the claim for monetary damages via a motion to amend the complaint,
that vehicle was not critical to the determination that a federal court
must apply federal common law to assess the availability of an adequate
remedy at law before awarding equitable restitution. Instead, the
Ninth Circuit focused on whether such an adequate remedy at law
exists (whether it has been claimed previously or not). As such,
practitioners will want to consider Sonner when determining (1) which
claims to pursue, (2) whether a jury or bench trial is preferred, and (3)
grounds to address in dispositive motion practice. Assuredly, the
Sonner decision will be on the minds of opposing counsel and will
provide a framework for future courts resolving these issues.

57 Id.
58 Id. at 845.
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., Mullins v. Premier Nutrition Corp., No. 13-cv-01271, 2018 WL 510139, at
*2 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2018) (citing numerous orders from the Northern District of
California dismissing equitable claims, including those for restitution, where plaintiff had
failed to establish that no adequate remedy at law was available), aff’d sub nom Sonner v.
Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020).
61 Id. at *3–4 (analyzing Plaintiff’s arguments and authority contending “she need not
establish an inadequate remedy at law”).

